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Abstract. A practical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol nec-
essarily runs in finite time and, hence, only a finite amount of communi-
cation is exchanged. This is in contrast to most of the standard results on
the security of QKD, which only hold in the limit where the number of
transmitted signals approaches infinity. Here, we analyze the security of
QKD under the realistic assumption that the amount of communication
is finite. At the level of the general formalism, we present new results
that help simplifying the actual implementation of QKD protocols: in
particular, we show that symmetrization steps, which are required by
certain security proofs (e.g., proofs based on de Finetti’s representation
theorem), can be omitted in practical implementations. Also, we demon-
strate how two-way reconciliation protocols can be taken into account in
the security analysis. At the level of numerical estimates, we present the
bounds with finite resources for “device-independent security” against
collective attacks.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most mature fields of
quantum information science, both from the theoretical and the experi-
mental point of view [1,2,3]. This does not mean, however, that the open
questions are merely technical ones: in this paper, we are concerned with
an issue that is in fact rather crucial for the assessment of security of real
devices.
Most unconditional security proofs of QKD have provided an asymp-
totic bound for the secret key rate r, valid only in the limit of infinitely
long keys [4,5,6,7,8]. This reads in general [9]
r = S(X|E) −H(X|Y ) , (1)
where S(X|E) := S(XE)−S(E) and H(X|Y ) := H(XY )−H(Y ) are the
conditional von Neumann and Shannon entropies, respectively, evaluated
for the joint state of Alice and Bob’s raw key and the system controlled
by Eve (after the sifting step).
In real experiments, obviously, finite resources are used. As a matter of
fact, the need for finite key analysis was recognized several years ago [10].
In early security proofs though, the security parameter
“Deviation from the ideal case” ≤ ε . (2)
was defined in terms of “accessible information”. This measure of devi-
ation had two shortcomings, namely (i) it does not provide composable
security, as proved in [11], and (ii) it has no operational interpretation.
It turns out that both shortcomings are not problematic for asymptotic
bounds1, but for finite-key analysis a different definition must be used.
A correct definition was used for the first time in [13], but the authors
considered only a restricted class of attacks. While partial, these and
other studies [14,15,16] triggered the awareness that a large N would be
required for a QKD experiment to produce a secure key.
More recently, Hayashi used a valid definition (although the concern
for composable security is not addressed explicitly) in his analysis of the
BB84 protocol with decoy states [17]. Hayashi’s bound has been applied
to experimental data [18]. Apart from being possibly the first creation of
a truly unconditional secure key, this experiment provides an instructive
example of how critical finite key analysis is. Indeed, for the observed
error rate Q ≈ 5% and the choice ε = 2−9, 4100 secret bits could be
extracted from each raw key block of n ≈ N2 = 105 bit: in other words,
the final secret key rate was r ≈ 2%, instead of the r ≈ 43% predicted by
the asymptotic bound. Security bounds for finite resources are definitely
one of the most urgent tasks for practical QKD [3].
Recently we have shown that the theoretical tools developed by one
of us [19] can be used to provide a compact approach to security proofs
in the non-asymptotic limit [20]. Our formalism leads to a generalized
version of the secret key rate that reads
r = (n/N) [Sξ(X|E) −∆− leakEC/n] . (3)
Comparing with (1), four modifications should be noticed: (i) only a frac-
tion n of the signals contributes to the key, the rest must be used for
1 The absence of an operational interpretation of ε is not a problem since any devia-
tion is supposed to vanish for asymptotically long keys. Furthermore, the fact that
asymptotic bounds can be “redeemed” for composability is a consequence of the re-
sult of [12] saying that keys obtained by two-universal hashing provide composable
security.
parameter estimation; (ii) the parameter estimation has finite precision
ξ; (iii) the task of privacy amplification itself has a security parameter ∆;
and (iv) the error correction protocol may not reach the Shannon limit,
so leakEC ≥ nH(X|Y ).
In this paper, we revisit our previous work and improve it by two
important observations (Lemmas 1 and 2 below), then we present a new
example of explicit calculation (Section 4.2).
2 Basic definitions
2.1 Definition of security
In the existing literature on QKD, not only the analysis, but also the
very definition of security is mostly limited to the asymptotic case; and
we therefore need to revisit it here. Most generally, the security of a key
K can be parametrized by its deviation ε from a perfect key, which is
defined as a uniformly distributed bit string whose value is completely
independent of the adversary’s knowledge. In an asymptotic scenario, a
key K of length ℓ is commonly said to be secure if this deviation ε tends
to zero as ℓ increases. In the non-asymptotic scenario studied here, how-
ever, the deviation ε is always finite. This makes it necessary to attribute
an operational interpretation to the parameter ε. Only then is it possible
to choose a meaningful security threshold (i.e., an upper bound for ε)
reflecting the level of security we are aiming at. Another practically rele-
vant requirement that we need to take into account is composability of the
security definition. Composability guarantees that a key generated by a
QKD protocol can safely be used for applications, e.g., as a one-time-pad
for message encryption. Although this requirement is obviously crucial
for practice, it is not met by most security definitions considered in the
literature [11].
Our results are formulated in terms of a security definition that meets
both requirements, i.e., it is composable and, in addition, the parameter
ε has an operational interpretation. The definition we use was proposed
in [21,12]: for any ε ≥ 0, a key K is said to be ε-secure with respect to an
adversary E if the joint state ρKE satisfies
1
2
∥∥ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ ε , (4)
where τK is the completely mixed state on K. The parameter ε can be
seen as the maximum probability that K differs from a perfect key (i.e.,
a fully random bit string) [12]. Equivalently, ε can be interpreted as the
maximum failure probability, where failure means that “something went
wrong”, e.g., that an adversary might have gained some information on
K. From this perspective, it is also easy to understand why the definition
is composable. In fact, the failure probability of any cryptosystem that
uses a perfect secret key only increases by (at most) ε if we replace the
perfect key by an ε-secure key. In particular, because one-time pad en-
cryption with a perfect key has failure probability 0 (the ciphertext gives
zero information about the message), it follows that one-time-pad encryp-
tion based on an ε-secure key remains perfectly confidential, except with
probability at most ε.
2.2 Description of the Generic Protocol
Although most practical quantum key distribution protocols are prepare-
and-measure schemes, for analyzing their security it is often more con-
venient to consider an entanglement-based formulation. In fact, such a
formulation can be obtained by simply replacing all classical random-
ness by quantum entanglement and postponing all measurements. In the
following, we describe the general type of protocol our analysis applies
to.
1. Distribution of quantum information: Alice and Bob communicate
over an (insecure) quantum channel to generate N identical and inde-
pendent pairs of entangled particles.2 The joint state of the N particle
pairs together with the information that an adversary might have on
them (e.g., acquired by eavesdropping) is denoted by ρANBNEN .
2. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob apply a LOCC-measurement3
to m particle pairs selected at random (using the authentic commu-
nication channel). We denote the resulting statistics by λm and the
joint state of the remaining (not measured) particles and Eve’s system
by ρAN−mBN−mEN . If the statistics λm fails to satisfy certain criteria,
Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
3. Measurement and advantage distillation: Alice and Bob apply block-
wise measurements EAbBb on their remaining particles to get raw keys
Xn and Y n, respectively. More precisely, EAbBb is an arbitrary LOCC-
measurement applied sequentially to blocks Ab of b particles on Alice’s
2 We use the term particle here only for concreteness. More generally, they might be
arbitrary subsystems.
3 A LOCC-measurement is a measurement on a bipartite system that can be per-
formed by local measurements on the subsystems combined with classical commu-
nication.
side and the corresponding particles Bb on Bob’s side. In a protocol
without advantage distillation, EAbBb = EA ⊗ EB simply consists of
local measurements on single particles, i.e., b = 1. However, EAbBb
might describe any operation that can be performed by Alice and Bob
on a finite block of particle pairs. The resulting state is then given by
ρXnY nEN = (E⊗nAbBb ⊗ idEN )(ρXbnY bnEN ), where n is the number of
blocks, i.e., nb ≤ N −m.
4. Error correction: Alice and Bob exchange classical messages, summa-
rized by C, which allow Bob to compute a guess Xˆbn for Alice’s string
Xbn.
5. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob generate the final key by ap-
plying an appropriately chosen hash function to Xbn and Xˆbn, re-
spectively. The requirement on the hash function is that it maps
strings with sufficiently high min-entropy to uniform strings of a cer-
tain length ℓ (such functions are sometimes called strong (quantum)
extractors). A typical (and currently the only known) class of func-
tions satisfying this requirement are two-universal hash functions (see
Section 3.4 for examples of two-universal function families).
3 Security analysis
3.1 Security against collective attacks
An attack is said to be collective if the interaction of Eve with the quan-
tum channel during the distribution step is i.i.d. This implies that the
state after the distribution step is i.i.d., too, that is, ρANBNEN = σ
⊗N
ABE ,
where σABE is the density operator describing a single particle pair to-
gether with the corresponding ancilla E held by Eve.
The following analysis is subdivided into four parts. Each part gives
rise to separate errors, denoted by εPE, ε¯, εEC, and εPA, respectively.
These sum up to
ε = εPE + ε¯+ εEC + εPA , (5)
where ε is the security of the final key (cf. (4) for the definition of security).
Making the individual contributions smaller comes at the cost of reducing
other parameters that, eventually, result in a reduction of the size of the
final key (see equations (6), (8), (10), and (11)).
– Parameter estimation (minimize set of compatible states Γ and num-
ber of sample points m vs. minimize failure probability εPE).
Parameter estimation allows Alice and Bob to determine properties of
σAB . We express this by defining a set ΓεPE containing all states σAB
that are compatible with the outcomes of the parameter estimation.
For concreteness, we assume here that Alice and Bob—depending on
the statistics of their measurements—either continue with the exe-
cution of the protocol or abort. The set ΓεPE is then defined as the
set of states σAB for which the protocol continues with probability
at least εPE (i.e., the states from which a key will be extracted with
non-negligible probability). The quantity εPE corresponds therefore
to the probability that the parameter estimation passes although the
raw key does not contain sufficient secret correlation. In particular, if
Alice and Bob continue the protocol whenever they observe a statis-
tics λm using a POVM with d possible outcomes then (Lemma 3 of
[20])
ΓεPE ⊆
{
σAB : ‖λm − λ∞(σAB)‖ ≤
√
2 ln(1/εPE)+d ln(m+1)
m
}
(6)
where λ∞(σAB) denotes the (perfect) statistics in the limit of infinitely
many measurements.
– Calculation of the min-entropy (minimize decrease of min-entropy δ
vs. minimize error probability ε¯).
Under the assumption of collective attacks, the joint state of Alice and
Bob’s as well as the relevant part of Eve’s system after the measure-
ment and advantage distillation step is of the form ρXnY nEbn = σ
⊗n
XY Eb
where
σXYEb := (EAbBb ⊗ idEb)(σ⊗bABE) (7)
This property allows to compute a lower bound on the smooth min-
entropy of Xn given Eve’s overall information EN (before error cor-
rection), which will play a crucial role in the analysis of the remaining
part of the protocol. More precisely, the min-entropy can be expressed
in terms of the von Neumann entropy S evaluated for the state σXEb ,
H ε¯∞(X
n|EN ) ≥ n(S(X|Eb)σ
XEb
− δ) (8)
where δ := 7
√
log2(2/ε¯)
n .
– Error correction (information leakage leak vs. failure probability εEC).
Error correction necessarily involves communication C between Alice
and Bob. The maximum leakage of information to an adversary is
expressed in terms of min- and max-entropies,
leak := H0(C)−H∞(C|XnY n) .
While H0(C) corresponds to the total number of relevant bits ex-
changed during error correction, we subtract H∞(C|XnY n) which is
the number of bits that are independent of the raw key pair (Xn, Y n).
Note the formal resemblance of this expression to the mutual informa-
tion I(C : XnY n). Indeed, the quantity leak counts the number of bits
of C that are correlated to the raw key. In particular, any informa-
tion that is independent of the raw key, such as the description of an
error correcting code, does not contribute. Also, in a protocol where
redundant messages are exchanged (this is for instance the case for
two-way error correction schemes such as the Cascade protocol [22]),
the quantity leak is generally much smaller than the total number of
communicated bits.
Typically, there is a trade-off between the leakage leak and the failure
probability, i.e., the maximum probability that Xˆ 6= X (where the
maximum is taken over all possible states in ΓεPE), which we denote
by εEC. This trade-off depends strongly on the actual error correction
scheme that is employed, but typically has the form
leakεEC = fH0(X|Y ) + log2
2
εEC
(9)
where f is a constant larger than 1. In theory, there are error correction
schemes with f arbitrarily close to 1, but the decoding is usually not
feasible due to computational limitations. In practice, f ≈ 1.05− 1.2.
– Privacy amplification (maximize final key length ℓ vs. minimize failure
probability εPA).
To evaluate the final key size, we need to bound the decrease of min-
entropy after the leakage of information that occurred in error correc-
tion. It follows from Lemma 2 below that the smooth min-entropy of
Xn given Eve’s information after error correction is bounded by
H ε¯∞(X
n|ENC) ≥ H ε¯∞(Xn|EN )− leakεEC . (10)
The security of the final key only depends on this quantity and the
efficiency of the hash function used for privacy amplification. More
precisely, if two-universal hashing4 is used then, for any fixed εPA > 0,
the maximum length ℓ of the final key is bounded by
ℓ ≤ H ε¯(Xn|ENC)− 2 log2
1
εPA
. (11)
4 Two-universal hashing is the procedure normally used for privacy amplification.
Combining (8), (10) and (11), we conclude that the final key is ε-
secure, for ε = εPE + ε¯+ εEC + εPA as in (5), if
ℓ ≤ n
[
min
σABE∈ΓεPE
S(X|Eb)σ
XEb
− δ(ε¯)
]
− leakεEC − 2 log2
1
εPA
(12)
where σXEb is related to σAB via (7) applied to a purification of σAB and
where δ(ε¯) = 7
√
log2(2/ε¯)
n .
3.2 Security analysis against general attacks
A general method to turn a proof against collective attacks into a proof
against the most general coherent attacks is to introduce additional sym-
metries. Here we highlight two aspects that have been dealt with only
partially in previous works.
A Lemma on symmetrization. The following lemma states that the smooth
min-entropy of the state before the symmetry operations have been ap-
plied is lower bounded by the smooth min-entropy of the symmetrized
state.
Lemma 1. Let ρXE be a cq-state and let {fR} be a family of functions
on X. Then, for any ε ≥ 0 and R chosen at random
Hε∞(X|E) ≥ Hε∞(fR(X)|ER) .
Proof. The statement is proved by sequentially applying rules of the
smooth entropy calculus.
Hε∞(X|E) = Hε∞(X|E) +H∞(R|R)
= Hε∞(XR|ER)
= Hε∞(fR(X)XR|ER)
≥ Hε∞(fR(X)|ER) .
The first equality holds because H∞(R|R) = 0 (there is no certainty
about R if R is known), and the second is a consequence of the additivity
of the min-entropy (Lemma 3.1.6 of [19]). The third equality is a simply
consequence of the fact that the computation of the value fR(X) while
keeping the input is a unitary operation, under which the min-entropy
is invariant. Finally, the inequality holds because tracing out the clas-
sical systems X and R can only decrease the smooth min-entropy (see
Lemma 3.1.9 of [19]).
An important practical consequence of this Lemma is that the sym-
metrization needs not be actually implemented. Indeed, the smooth min-
entropy is basically the only quantity that is relevant for the security
of the final key: then, the statement of the Lemma implies that, if the
symmetrized version of the protocol is secure, the original version is also
secure.
Permutation symmetry. Lemma 1 above is valid for any symmetrization.
Typically, one considers permutation symmetry. This can be achieved,
for instance, by randomly permuting the positions of the bits [19] (more
precisely, Alice and Bob both apply the same, randomly chosen, reorder-
ing to their bitstring). The symmetric states can then be shown to have
properties similar to those of i.i.d. states, e.g. via the quantum de Finetti
theorem [23]. This in turn leads to a bound of the form (8), with a different
definition of the parameter δ (cf. Theorem 6.5.1 in [19], referring to Table
6.2 for the parameters; the corrections due to the de Finetti theorem are
the terms that involve the quantities k and r). Thus, a lower bound for
security using finite resources can be computed for any discrete-variable
protocol.
Such a bound turns out to be very pessimistic: this is the price to pay
for its generality5. When considering some specific protocols, there can
be other, more efficient ways to obtain i.i.d. Specifically, for the BB84 [24]
and the six-state protocol [25,26,27], suitable symmetries can be imple-
mented in the protocol itself by random but coordinated bit- and phase
flips [28,29]. Security bounds against general attacks can be computed by
considering i.i.d. states just because of these symmetries, thus by-passing
the need for the de Finetti theorem.
3.3 Decrease of the smooth min-entropy by information
leakage
An essential part of the technical security proof presented above is the
following lemma, which provides a bound on the decrease of the min-
entropy by information leakage in the error correction step. The statement
shown here is a generalization of a corresponding statement in [19], which
has been restricted to one-way error correction.
5 Also, it is an open question whether the existing de Finetti theorem provides tight
estimates, or if the bounds can be improved.
Lemma 2. The decrease of the smooth min-entropy by the leakage of
information in the error correction step is given by
Hε∞(X|EC) ≥ Hε∞(X|E) − leak .
Proof.
Hε∞(X|EC) ≥ Hε∞(XC|E) −H0(C)
≥ Hε∞(X|E) +H∞(C|XE) −H0(C)
≥ Hε∞(X|E) +H∞(C|XY E)−H0(C)
= Hε∞(X|E) +H∞(C|XY )−H0(C)
The first two inequalities are chain rules and the third is the strong sub-
additivity for the smooth min-entropy. The last equality follows from the
fact that E ↔ (X,Y )↔ C is a Markov chain, because the communication
C is computed by Alice and Bob.
3.4 Two-universal hashing
As explained above, privacy amplification is usually done by two-universal
hashing.
Definition 1. A set F of functions f from X to Z is called two-universal
if
Pr
f∈F
[
f(x) = f(x′)
] ≤ 1|Z| ,
for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X and f chosen at random from F according to
the uniform distribution.
To perform the privacy amplification step, the two parties simply have
to choose at random a function f from a two-universal set F of functions
that output strings of length ℓ, where ℓ is chosen such that it satisfies (12).
As shown below, there exist constructions of two-universal sets F of func-
tions that are both easy to describe (the description length is equal to
the input length) and that can be efficiently evaluated.
Examples of two-universal function families have first been proposed
by Carter and Wegman [30,31]. One of the constructions mapping n-bit
strings to ℓ-bit strings, for any ℓ ≤ n, only involves addition and multi-
plication in the field GF(2n). It is defined as the family F = {fr}r∈GF(2n)
of functions fr that, on input x, output the ℓ least significant bits of r · x
(where · denotes the multiplication in GF(2n)), i.e.,
fr : GF(2
n) −→ GF(2ℓ)
x 7−→ [r · x]ℓ .
4 Computing security bounds
4.1 Summary of the previous section
Let us re-phrase the results obtained above in a more operational way.
An experiment is characterized by the following parameters:
– The protocol, in particular d the number of outcomes of the measure-
ments;
– The number of exchanged quantum signals N ;
– The estimates of the channel parameters;
– The performances of the error correction protocol, in particular εEC
and f (recall that these are functions of the parameters);
– The desired level of security ε.
We have found above the bound (12) for the extractable secret key length
ℓ, which is valid for collective attacks, and also for general attacks in the
case of the BB84 and the six-state protocols. By setting r = ℓN , one gets
the announced expression (3) for the secret key rate.
The expression for r is thus a function of the parameters listed above
and several others, namely:
– n, b and m, subject to the constraint nb+m ≤ N ;
– εPE, ε¯ and εPA, subject to the constraint ε = εPE + ε¯+ εEC + εPA.
The best value for r is therefore obtained by optimizing (12) over the free
parameters6, for a given experiment.
In Ref. [20], we have presented such an optimization for the BB84
and the six-state protocols implemented with single photons, under the
restriction that f is a constant and b = 1 (one-way error correction). Here,
we present the computation of the security bound with finite resources
for another protocol.
4.2 An application: “device-independent security” against
collective attacks
In 1991, Ekert noticed that the security of QKD could be related to
the violation of Bell’s inequalities [32]. This remark provided him with
the basic intuition, but it remained purely qualitative. Only recently, on
a modified version of the Ekert protocol [33], it has been possible to
6 Note that a parameter may be free a priori but be fixed in a given experiment. For
instance, if in BB84 the choice of the basis is made passively through a 50-50 beam
splitter, one has the additional constraint m = nb.
provide a quantitative bound on Eve’s information that depends only
on the violation of a particular Bell-type inequality [34]. The remarkable
property of this study is that this bound is “device-independent”: the
knowledge of (i) the dimension of the Hilbert space in which Alice’s and
Bob’s signals are encoded and of (ii) the details of the measurements
that are performed, is not required. The price to pay for such generality
is that there is, as of today, no argument to conclude to unconditional
security7: the bound has been proved only for collective attacks. It is
also worth stressing that, as long as the detection loophole remains open,
device-independent security cannot be assessed on real setups [34,35].
Using our approach, we are going to obtain the non-asymptotic bound
for device-independent security against collective attacks. We can use (12)
directly. Two elements depend on the protocol and must be discussed:
– The relation between n and m depends on the measurements specified
by the protocol (here we set b = 1). The protocol specifies that Alice
performs three measurements A0, A1 and A2, while Bob performs
two measurements B1 and B2. The key is extracted out of the events
(A0, B1). Coherence in the channel is checked by the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [36] using (A1, A2;B1, B2), i.e. from
the quantity
C = E(A1B1) + E(A1B2) + E(A2B1)−E(A2B2) (13)
where E(AiBj) = Prob(ai = bj) − Prob(ai 6= bj) is the correlation
coefficient for bits. We suppose that Alice chooses A0 with probability
pa0 and the other settings with equal probability pa1 = pa2 = (1 −
pa0)/2; and that Bob chooses B1 with probability pb1 and B2 with
probability 1− pb1. Therefore
n = pa0pb1N , mij =
1
2
(1− pa0)pbjN (14)
and the other events are discarded.
– In (12), only Sξ(X|E) ≡ maxσABE∈ΓεPE S(X|Eb)σXEb depends on the
protocol, and this quantity contains only the imprecision of the pa-
rameter estimation as a finite-key effect — indeed, the other three
7 This is in particular true because one does not bound the dimension of the Hilbert
space; so the available de Finetti theorem cannot be used. It is important to stress
that the usual unconditional security bounds do rely on the assumption that the
dimension of the Hilbert space is known — and this is actually more serious than
just a technical assumption for the proofs: most protocols, like BB84 and six-state,
become provably insecure if one cannot rely on the fact that a meaningful fraction
of the measurements are done on two-qubit signals.
modifications due to the finite resources, listed in Section 3.1, give
rise to the other terms in (12) that are independent of the protocol.
Therefore, we only have to allow a deviation of the measured parame-
ters by the quantity ξ(m,d) =
√
2 ln(1/εPE)+d ln(m+1)
m as defined in (6).
The asymptotic version [34]
Sξ=0(X|E) = 1− h
(
1 +
√
(C/2)2 − 1
2
)
(15)
depends only on C given in (13). Now, the deviation on the estimate of
E(AiBj) is ξ(mij , 2) because a correlation coefficient can be measured
by a POVM with d = 2 outcomes (“equal bits” and “different bits”).
The most unfavorable case being obviously the one when the true
value of C is lower than the estimated one, we obtain
Sξ(X|E) = 1− h
(
1 +
√
[(C − ξ)/2]2 − 1
2
)
(16)
with ξ =
∑2
i,j=1 ξ(mij , 2).
Having described the quantities that depend on the protocol, we can run
the optimization of r for any N and for some chosen values of ε, εEC,
f and the observed parameters (C and the error rate Q). The result is
plotted in Fig. 1. Similarly to what observed for BB84 and six-states [20],
no key can be extracted for N . 105, and the asymptotic value is reached
only for N & 1015. By monitoring the parameters of the optimization, one
finds also that pa0 and pb1 tend to 1 in the limit N →∞, as expected.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built on our previous work on finite-key analysis
[20] and completed it with some important remarks. Lemma 1 shows that
the symmetrization of the data, although required to achieve security
proofs, does not need to be done actively, because the min-entropy of
the symmetrized data provides a bound for the min-entropy of the non-
symmetrized ones. Lemma 2 extends our formalism to include two-way
information reconciliation. After completing the general formalism with
these Lemmas, we have applied it to derive a finite-key bound for device-
independent security against collective attacks (Section 4.2).
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Fig. 1. Finite-key bound for device-independent security against collec-
tive attacks: secret key rate r as a function of the number of exchanged
quantum signals N , for two values of the observed error rate Q; we have
assumed the relation C = 2√2(1 − 2Q), which implies C ≈ 2.715 for
Q = 2% and C ≈ 2.546 for Q = 5%. We have fixed ε = 10−5, εEC = 10−10
and f = 1.2; we have supposed symmetric errors Prob(a0 6= b1) = Q, so
that H0(X|Y ) in (9) is replaced by h(Q).
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